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UNITED STATES v. YIAN
905 E Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
United States District Court, Southern District of New York
I.

FACTS

On October 5, 1994, a Grand Jury returned an
indictment against the defendant Chen De Yian, a
recent immigrant from China, for conspiracy to commit interstate murder-for-hire and use of a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence. On
March 6, 1995, the government filed a superseding
indictment with three additional counts, including
conspiracy to attempt hostage-taking and hostagetaking. Yian had already pled guilty under state law
for these additional crimes. In response to the superseding indictment, he filed additional motions
on April 10, 1995 to dismiss the two hostage taking
counts on the grounds that the statute under which
he was charged, the Hostage Taking Act,I was un2
constitutional.
Congress enacted the Hostage Taking Act as
part of a three-bill package designed to combat
the rise of terrorism.3 Specifically, the Act implemented the International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages ("Convention") which the
United Nations General Assembly adopted on
December 17, 1979, and the United States and
forty-five other countries signed on December 21,
1979. 4 The Act criminalized the seizing of hos-

118 U.S.C. § 1203 (1994). The Hostage Taking Act
provides in relevant part: (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, whoever, whether inside or
outside the United States, seizes or detains and threatens
to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person
in order to compel a third person or a governmental orga-

nization to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit
or implicit condition for the release of the person detained,
or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished by
imprisonment ....(b)(1) It is not an offense under this
section if the conduct required for the offense occurred
outside the United States unless-(A) the offender or the
person seized or detained is a national of the United States;
(B) the offender is found in the United States; or (C) the
governmental organization sought to be compelled is the
Government of the United States. (2) It is not an offense
under this section if the conduct required for the offense
occurred inside the United States, each alleged offender
and each person seized or detained are nationals of the
United States, and each alleged offender is found in the
United States, unless the governmental organization
sought to be compelled is the Government of the United
States.

tages only when the perpetrator or the victim was
not a United States national.5
Yian advanced three constitutional defects in the
Act. First, he alleged that the broad language of the
Act was not "necessary and proper for carrying into
[e]xecution" the Congress' treaty-making power
contained in Art. 1 § 8 of the Constitution because
it included conduct not essential to the implementation of the Convention. 6The Convention was narrowly targeted at combating international terrorism,

but the broadly worded Hostage Taking Act
criminalized hostage taking regardless of whether it
was pursuant to terrorism. Second, the Yian asserted
that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment 7 because the Act was not limited to conduct which
8
could be classified as interstate or international.
Finally, he argued the Act violated the Equal Protection guarantee inherent in the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause because it impermissibly imposed criminal liability based on alienage.9

II. HOLDING
The court found all three of Yian's contentions
unpersuasive. The court held that the Hostage Tak-

ingAct passed constitutional muster under the Nec-

2 See

United States v.Yian, 905 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y.

1995).
3
Yian, 905 F. Supp. at 162.
4Terrorism Taking of Hostages Convention Between
the United States of
America and Other Governments, Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1983 WL 144724 [hereinafter Convention].
-118U.S.C. § 1203.
6Yian, 905 F Supp. at 163 n. 4 (citing U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, d. 10). The Necessary and Proper Clause states
in relevant part: "The Congress shall have Power... To
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof" 905 . Supp. at 163 n. 4.
'The Tenth Amendment reads, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people" U.S. Const. amend. X.
8
Yian, 905 F. Supp. at 163.
9Id.

essary and Proper Clause because it was reasonably
related to carrying into execution the United States'
Treaty Power ofArticle 1, § 2 of the Constitution.' 0
In addition, the district court held that the Act did
not violate the Tenth Amendment because a United
States treaty may override any state's power over
relations which usually fall within that state's control.I Finally, the court held the Act's alienage classification did not violate Equal Protection because
it reasonably furthered the legitimate government
2
interest of fighting international terrorism.'

but to tackle a discrete offense intimately associated with terrorism, namely, hostage taking. 17 Indeed, the Convention's definition of hostage taking
made no reference whatsoever to "terrorism."' 8 Finding that the Convention neither defined "terrorism"
nor included political or social motivation in its definition of hostage taking, the court concluded that
the Hostage Taking Act was reasonably related to

III. APPLICATION/ANALYSIS

Proper Clause.20

purpose was not to combat "terrorism" in general,

implementing the Convention.19The court held that,
therefore, Congress had the power to implement

the Convention pursuant to the Necessary and
A. NECESSARY AND PROPER
Citing M'Culloch v. Maryland,13 the court ruled
that rational basis was the appropriate judicial standard for reviewing legislation allegedly in violation
of the Necessary and Proper Clause.' 4 Under this
deferential level of scrutiny, a court must find a statute "necessary and proper" so long as it bears a reasonable relationship to carrying out a grant of power
to the federal government and is not otherwise prohibited by law. 5 Therefore, even assuming that the
Convention was, as Yian asserted, "narrowly targeted" at the problem of international terrorism, the
legislation which implemented the Convention had
to be only rationally related to fighting terrorism,
6
not narrowly-tailored to that end.'
The court went on to find that the Convention's
10 1d. at 165.
1id.
121d.at 168.
13M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The
Court set out the rational basis test as follows: "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are

plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional." M'Culoch, 17 U.S. at 421.
14Yian, 905 F. Supp. at 163.
'-905 E Supp. at 163. See also Missouri v. Holland,

252 U.S. 416 (1920). "Ifthe treaty is valid there can be no
dispute about the validity of the statute under Article 1,
Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the
powers of the Government." Holland, 252 US. at 432.
6Yian, 905 F.Supp. at 163.
17905 F. Supp. at 163.
8

1Id. at'164. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (te)Et supra

note 1). The Hostage Taking Act tracks the Convention's
definition of hostage taking, including the specific exclusion of domestic hostage taking when the hostage and the
alleged offender are nationals of the State in which the
offense occurred: "This Convention shall not apply where

B.

FEDERALISM AND
THE TENTH AMENDMENT

Yian's second objection to the Hostage Taking

Act was that Congress had exceeded its treaty-making powers by reaching beyond matters of national
or international importance and usurping states' traditional power to establish the criminal law within
their borders.2' Yian cited dicta from the Supreme
Court in Missouri v. HoUand 2 to support his contention that Congress' power to implement treaties
was limited to matters of national or international
concern. 3 However, the court found no language in
Holland to support Yian's proposition.2 4 It noted,
rather, the Holland Court's observing that a federal

treaty may override a state's traditional power of
regulating relations within its jurisdiction.2 5 Al-

the offence is committed within a single State, the hostage and the alleged offender are nationals of that State
and the alleged offender is found in the territory of that
State." Convention, supra note 4, at *4.
19 Yzan, 905 E Supp. at 164-65.
20905
F. Supp. at 162.
2
'Id. at 165.

2Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
23 Yian, 905 F.Supp. at 165. Specifically, Yian relied
on the following passage from Holland:"It is obvious that
there may be matter of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal
with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and
it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring
national action, a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government is not to be
found." Holland, 252 U.S. at 433 (emphasis added) (internal24 quotations omitted).
Yian, 905 F.Supp. at 165.
25
The Holland Court stated, "Valid treaties of course
are as binding within the territorial limits of the States as
they are elsewhere throughout the dominion of the United
States. No doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may

though acts of Congress are the supreme law of the
land only when enacted pursuant to an enumerated
power under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, treaties take precedent when made under the
authority of the United States.26 This fundamental
difference between domestic legislation and international treaties has led to the contention that all
Tenth Amendment challenges to the Treaty Power
are structurally unsound. 27 In the words of one constitutional law scholar:
Since the Treaty Power was delegated to the Federal
Government, whatever was within it was not reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. Many
matters, then, may be 'reserved to the States' as regards domestic legislation but not as regards international agreement. They are, one might say, left to
the States subject to defeasance if the United28States
should decide to make a treaty about them.

The Act criminalized a hostage taking only if one of
the offenders or one of the persons seized or denot a United States national-i.e was an
tained was
"alien."30 As a result, the court held that the Hostage Taking Act facially discriminated on the basis
of alienage.

31

The court also rejected Yian's contention that
the Hostage Taking Act violated the equal protection guarantee inherent in the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. To resolve this issue, the court
had to make two determinations: whether the Act
discriminated on the basis of alienage, and if so, the
what the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny was.21

In deciding what level of scrutiny to apply, the
court noted that the power of Congress to regulate
aliens within the nation's borders was more complete than any other congressional power.3 2 As a result, the court found the appropriate standard of
review necessarily depended on whether the law was
passed by Congress or by the states.Y If Congress
had passed the law, the classification would survive
judicial scrutiny as long as it reasonably furthered a
legitimate government interest.3 4 The Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Diaz s recognized that because
"decisions in [matters regarding the relationship
between the United States and its alien visitors] may
implicate our relations with foreign powers, and
since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing political and economic
circumstances," any rule of constitutional law that
would burden the government's response to such
changing global conditions "should be adopted only
with the greatest caution."36 Both the Second and
Ninth Circuits seized upon this dicta and surmised
that the Supreme Court adopted a standard of minimal review when reviewing congressionally enacted37
legislation whch classified on the basis of alienage
Applying a rational basis standard of review, the
court held that the alienage classification in the
Hostage Taking Act did not violate equal protection

override its power." Holland, 252 U.S. at 434 (internal

Harisiadesv. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)

Because the court lacked any precedent for Yian's
asserted limitation on the federal government's treaty
making powers, it held that the Hostage Taking Act
did not violate the Tenth Amendment.
C. EQUAL PROTECTION

quotations and citations omitted). See alsoAsakura v. City

of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting the granting of pawnbroker's license to
aliens violated a treaty between the United States and
Japan and was unconstitutional under the Supremacy
of the Constitution).
Clause
26
Holland,252 U.S. at 432.

27Yian,

28905

905 F.Supp. at 165 n.18.
E Supp. at 165 n.18.

2id.at 166.
3

Id. This limitation did not apply if the United States

government was the party compelled to comply with a.
demand, such as a ransom note, in exchange for the release31of a hostage. See 18 U.S.C. § 1203.
Yian, 905 F.Supp. at 166.
32905 F. Supp. at 166 (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 33792 (1977)).
1d. at 167. See also Plylerv.Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219
n. 19 (1982) (stating, "[w]ith respect to the actions of the
Federal Government, alienage classifications may be intimately related to the conduct of foreign policy");

(stating that "any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations").
34Yian, 905 F.Supp. at 164-65.
3

SMathews v. Diaz,426 U.S. 67 (1976). In Mathews,

resident aliens brought suit challenging the constitutionality of a Social Security Act provision that granted eligibility for enrollment in the Medicare part B supplemental medical insurance program to resident citizens who
were 65 or older, but it denied eligibility to aliens unless
they had been admitted for permanent residence and had
resided in the United States for at least five years. The
Court held that this dassification by Congress did not
deprive aliens of liberty or property without due process
of law. Id.
36
Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81.
3
7See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 76 (2d

Cir. 1984) (noting that "the [Supreme] Court has adopted
a stance of minimal scrutiny respecting federal regulations
that contain alienage-based dassifications"); United States
v. Lopez-Flores, 63 F.3d 1468, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1995)

because it reasonably furthered the legitimate gov38
ernment interest of fighting international terrorism.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Hostage Taking Act raises a number of issues regarding federalism and equal protection. If
Congress had attempted to assert jurisdiction over
all acts of hostage taking, even those not covered by
the Convention, the resulting statute could violate
the Tenth Amendment. Unlike the federal kidnapping statute39 which contains five readily identifiable jurisdictional elements, the Hostage Taking Act
contains no similar requirements for federal jurisdiction. It does, however, require that either the offender or the victim to be a non-citizen of the United
States.40 Without this alienage classification, the Act
would extend to all acts of hostage taking, some of
which would contain no independent basis for Congress to assert federal jurisdiction. The need to comply with both the Convention and the Tenth Amendment necessitated the use of alienage as a
jurisidictional element. Commenting on the Hostage Taking Act, New York District Judge Sonia
Sotomayor eloquently wrote:
It is unfortunate that the federal government,
through its treaty power and in subsequent [enabling] legislation, saw fit to criminalize conduct specifically on the basis of the alienage of
the persons involved. It troubles this Court to
contemplate that its holding today might come
to be relied upon as authority in support of some
other provision or regime which, at bottom,
effects no sounder purpose than to discriminate
against persons on the basis of their alienage.
Nevertheless, this does not appear to be the
motivation behind the Hostage Taking Act. In
light of the deference afforded the federal govemnment in connection with legislation passed
pursuant to its immigration and foreign policy

(holding, "Federal legislation that classifies on the basis of
alienage, enacted pursuant to Congress' immigration or
foreign policy powers, is therefore subject to the lowest
level of judicial review").
38 7an, 905 F.Supp. at 168.
39
18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994).
4018 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(2) (1994).
"' United States v. Yi, 951 F. Supp. 42, 46 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
42Message from the President
of the United States

Transmitting Four Drafts of Proposed Legislation to Attack the Pressing and Urgent Problem of International

powers, the Act must therefore be upheld as
constitutional.4'
Even assuming that the Act's underlying purpose was not to discriminate on the basis of alienage,
the Act as applied by the United States Attorney's
Office in Chen De Yian's case still raises equal protection concerns. Contrary to the district court's
opinion, ample evidence in the legislative history of
the Hostage Taking Act and in case law discussing
the Act indicated both the executive and legislative
branches understood that the purpose of the Act
was to fight international or political terrorism. President Ronald Reagan, in his message transmitting the
proposed legislation to Congress, described its ultimate aim: "To demonstrate to other governments
and international forums that the United States is
serious about its efforts to deal with international
terrorism, it is essential that the Congress provide
the necessary enabling legislation, so that we may
fully implement the Hostage-Taking Convention."4
Deputy Assistant Director Wayne R. Gilbert of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation further explained:
"The Hostage-Taking Act would extend our
jurisidiction and authority to act, where deemed
appropriate, on certain terrorist related hostage situations both within the United States and internationally."43 In United Sates v. Lopez-Flores, the Ninth

Circuit stated that"[s]trong foreign policy concerns
arising from the increased threat of in-country terrorist attacks and the desire to meet the United
States' obligations under international treaties provided the impetus for passage of the Hostage Taking Act."44 In addition, the Yian court itself acknowl-

edged that the "foreign policy interest behind the
Hostage Taking Act [was] to attack the pressing and
urgent problem of international terrorism."45
Contrary to this understanding of the Act's purpose, the U.S. Attorney's Office brought federal
charges against Chen De Yian for an intra-state, even
intra-city, domestic kidnapping incident that did not

Terrorism, H.R. Doc. No. 211, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1984).
43

Legislative Initiatives to CurbDomestic and International Terrorism:Hearingson S.2626 Before the Subcomm.
on Security and Terrorism of the Senate JudiciaryComm.,

98th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1984).

44United States v. Lopez-Flores, 63

(9th 45Cir. 1995).

F.3d 1468, 1473

Yian, 905 F. Supp. at 168 (internal quotations omit-

ted).

have the slightest connection with international or
political terrorism. This system of concurrent federal and state criminal jurisdiction under the Act
allows multiple prosecutions for a single act of hostage taking by aliens but not for United States nationals. Perhaps United States District Court Judge
Kimba Wood said it best while describing the
alienage classification of the Hostage Taking Act:
"Although Congress's interest in combating international terrorism is dearly a legitimate government
purpose, care must be taken to ensure that this legitimate purpose is not used as a springboard to discriminate against aliens merely on the basis of
46
alienage."
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Edmund Chun

11 UnitedStatesv. Song, 1995WL 736872, *5 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).

